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Sri Lanka: Physical Reconstruction and 




This article gives an overview of the 26 year long ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and examines 
physical reconstruction and economic development as measures of conflict prevention and post-
conflict reconstruction. During the years of conflict, the Sri Lankan government performed some 
conflict prevention measures, but most of them caused counter effects, such as the attempt to 
provide “demilitarization”, which actually increased militarization on both sides, and “political 
power sharing” that was never honestly executed. Efforts in post-conflict physical reconstruction and 
economic development, especially after 2009, demonstrate their positive capacity as well as their 
conflict sensitivity. Although the Sri Lankan government initially had to be forced by international 
donors to include conflict sensitivity in its projects, more recently this has changed. The government 
now practices more conflict sensitivity in its planning and execution of physical reconstruction and 
economic development projects without external pressure.
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Introduction
Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa declared the end of the long 
lasting war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)1 on 19 
May 2009, which initiated a celebration throughout Sri Lanka. Nobody 
mentioned the fact that the “final solution” to the Tamil conflict was 
bloody and included thousands of casualties, caused devastation to 
infrastructure, and included many violations of human rights carried out 
by both sides. Even the international community of that time supported 
a military conclusion to the Sri Lankan conflict against the “declared 
terrorists”, LTTE (Weaver and Chamberlain, 2012). 
During the 26 years of conflict, the Sri Lankan government performed 
several conflict prevention measures with mixed outcomes, while some of 
them even produced counter effects. The first measure, “demilitarization” 
has been used to counter increased militarization on both sides, 
which caused a much higher scale of violence. The second measure, 
“political power sharing”, was never honestly or effectively executed by 
the Sri Lankan government. Additionally, the Tamils had an unrealistic 
independence strategy and did not have strong political representatives 
which finally led to the overall failure and limited political engagement 
between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamils. The third measure, 
“justice and reconciliation” never had any significant success and even 
today, after the defeat of the LTTE, the government manages to engage 
only in a narrow and non-transparent reconciliation process. The fourth 
conflict prevention measure – physical reconstruction and economic 
development – was exercised with more success than failure, and after 
the end of the conflict became the government’s primary pillar for 
ensuring long lasting peace (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011).  
The international community (especially UN agencies), the World Bank, 
different investment or development funds and many states have been 
involved in conflict resolution since the beginning of the conflict in 1983. 
Nevertheless, these organizations did not achieve much in any aspect of 
1 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), known also as Tamil Tigers, were founded in 1976 as one of the newly 
formed youth Tamil movements that believed in militancy and separation from Sri Lanka as the only way to protect 
the interests of the Tamil minority.
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conflict prevention, except for the physical reconstruction and economic 
development, because this was of interest to the Sri Lankan government. 
On a number of occasions, when the Sri Lankan government and the 
LTTE achieved a truce or violence decreased, reconstruction and 
development activities started, but did not last long. The longest period of 
meaningful reconstruction and development lasted three years from 2002 
to 2005. So, the question is: will this “final solution” provide enough time 
for long lasting reconstruction? The Sri Lankan president Rajapaksa seems 
to support a “yes” answer to this question. He demonstrated this intent in 
his speech to the Sri Lankan parliament on 19 May 2009, speaking in the 
native Tamil language, when he stated: “Our intention was to save the 
Tamil people from the cruel grip of the LTTE. We all must now live as equals 
in this free country. We must find a homegrown solution to this conflict. 
That solution should be acceptable to all the communities” (Weaver and 
Chamberlain, 2012). 
This article examines physical reconstruction and economic development 
as measures of conflict prevention and reconstruction after the conflict 
in Sri Lanka and following the promises of the Sri Lankan President. The 
outcomes are mixed, but mostly successful and with elements of conflict 
sensitivity. 
Conflict sensitive actions and programming seek to consciously avoid or 
minimize negative impacts (‘do no harm’) and equally consciously try 
to create positive impacts on the conflict dynamics. Conflict sensitivity 
has started to be promoted out of concerns of the inadvertent negative 
effects of interventions, projects, efforts that remained ‘conflict blind’ 
(Brabant, 2010, p.1).
Although in most cases the Sri Lankan government initially did not include 
conflict sensitivity in its projects, more recently that has changed and it 
now practices more conflict sensitivity in the planning and execution of 
physical reconstruction and economic development projects (Höglund 
and Orjuela, 2011). In the beginning, these changes in its approach were 
forced by international donors, but there are many examples today of 
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Sri Lanka
(“The World Factbook, Sri Lanka”, 2013)
The Origins of Ethnic Conflict and the Eelam Wars
The largest ethnic group are the Sinhalese (predominantly Buddhists) that 
make up 74% of the more than 21 million of Sri Lanka’s citizens. The Tamils 
(Indian and Sri Lankan) are the largest minority ethnic group estimated 
between 14%-18% due to differences in official data on ethnic groups 
and the use of languages (The World Factbook, Sri Lanka, 2013). Although 
there are other ethnic groups with diversities in religion or language 
these two groups have been the main rivals on the island for centuries. 
The latest conflict in Sri Lanka became widely known in the 1880s, but 
in order to explain the real reasons for the conflict it is necessary to 
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look back and understand the long lasting animosities and differences 
among these two ethnics. The first Sinhalese arrived in the 6th century 
B.C. and later on established a kingdom that with some breaks existed 
until the 13th century A.D. The Tamils, who claim to have been on the 
island before the Sinhalese arrived, also have statehood roots through 
the Tamil’s kingdom of the 14th century (The World Factbook, Sri Lanka, 
2013). Later, after periods when the coastal areas were controlled by 
the Dutch (16th century) and the Portuguese (17th century), the British 
occupied the island at the end of the 18th century and a few years after 
in 1802 Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon) became a British colony (The World 
Factbook, Sri Lanka, 2013). The British Crown applied the system of ruling 
colonies by favoring minority ethnic groups, and therefore the majority of 
English language schools were opened in Tamil areas. Later, Tamils filled 
main administration and security service positions. In the early twentieth 
century, the Sinhalese discontent led to a movement that demanded 
independence from the British Crown. In 1948, after peaceful negotiations, 
Sri Lanka was granted independence just a few months after India’s 
independence. The following few decades were characterized with 
strong Sinhalese political mobilization, and the parallel process of Tamil 
disenfranchisement from the state administration, especially from courts 
and police forces. That was the beginning of the frictions between the 
Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups that later escalated and developed 
into a large scale conflict. Thus, the Sinhalese majority began to shape 
the new state according to its preferences. According to a number of 
authors, the decisive points in the escalation of the conflict were: the 
Buddhist Committee of Inquiry and its effects on the elections of 1956; 
The Sinhala Only Act, which banned the Tamil language from official use; 
and the constitutional reforms of 1972, which recognized Sinhala as the 
official language of Sri Lanka and declared Buddhism as having a primary 
place over other religions (Manage, 2012, p.14). Although the reactions 
of Tamil politicians were only mild and manifested as peaceful political 
protests (1956, 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, 1979, and 1981), most of the time the 
Sinhalese majority answered with violent riots against the Tamil population 
that were allowed by government forces and with political actions/
documents that just reinforced tensions (Ranasinghe, 2009, pp.12-13). For 
example, in 1979 Sri Lanka’s Parliament with a Sinhalese majority passed 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act as a reaction to the emerging separatist 
movement in the Tamil populated area, especially in the North of Sri 
Lanka. Instead of preventing conflict, this Act had the opposite effect, and 
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alowed the security forces additional authorities, such as “extra-judicial 
killings“ in response to violence against them (Manage, 2012, p.15). Thus, 
an “unusual“ approach in managing Sri Lankan ethnic friction caused a 
transformation of Tamil civil and peaceful protests into more violent ones 
and to the creation of several “small but tight-knit youth movements that 
became convinced of militancy, and separation from the state, as the 
only way to protect Tamils“ (Manage, 2012, p.15). The most important and 
probably the main trigger in the 26 year long ethnic conflict were the 
riots which occurred in July 1983. At that point, the response of Sinhalese 
mobs to the death of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers in conflict with LTTE was the 
destruction and burning of Tamil homes and businesses, as well as killings 
that ended with hundreds of dead Tamils (Fair, 2005). Furthermore, there 
are many published reports that members of the Sri Lankan security forces 
actively participated in these atrocities and killings. Since 1983 as violence 
started, the number of Tamil refugees began to increase and that trend 
ended just recently. They were first placed in refugee camps, but later 
many of them emigrated abroad to more than 40 countries, such as 
India, Australia, the United States and some Western European countries. 
Additionally, especially large communities of Tamils can be found in 
Canada and the UK (De Votta, 2004). This trend developed a strong Tamil 
Diaspora that together with Indian Tamils (more than 60 million) directly 
blamed the Sri Lankan government for the violence and atrocities, but as 
a side effect the Tamil Diaspora came to accept and support the LTTE’s 
armed response as the right way to protect the Tamils in Sri Lanka. However, 
the voices calling for a more militant approach to the formation of a Tamil 
State (Eelam) became louder than the peaceful ones within Tamil youth 
organisations, which together with a large financial and political support 
of the Diaspora, led to long lasting and bloody armed conflict2. During 
the 80s and 90s, the LTTE carried on violent tactics and finally suceeded in 
military dominance over all other Tamil separatist movements in Sri Lanka, 
sometimes by ruthlessly eliminating their key personnel, forcing them to 
leave the island, or exerting strong pressure that many crossed over to 
support the government (e.g. Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), 
Tamil National Alliance (TNA), and Peoples Liberation of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOT)).
2 During the 1990s and 2000s the Tamil Diaspora raised and supplied 200 - 300 million USD annually to the LTTE 
and other separatist Tamil groups (O’Balance, 1990, p.22). 
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The decades of the civil war in Sri Lanka can be described through four 
periods, the Eelam wars I – IV, which were marked by several different 
cease-fire agreements3: 
 ● Eelam War I started with bloody riots during the “Black July“ 
of 1983 and continued with four years of guerrilla-like warfare 
by Tamil militant groups that at one point even controled the 
Vadamarachchi area on the North of the island. Eelam war I 
ended in 1987 after the signing of the India-Sri Lanka peace accord 
and India deploying several thousand peacekeepers to Sri Lanka 
(Indian Peace Keeping Force - IPKF). The Accord offered a degree 
of autonomy for Tamil majority areas in the North and East, but not 
independence.
 ● Eelam War II started in 1990 after IPKF left the country because 
the attempt to prevent violence of LTTE failed. LTTE got control of 
the North and East areas of the island and armed conflicts with Sri 
Lankan armed forces escalated as LTTE became stronger. Although 
in 1993 President Premadasa was killed by LTTE, the second Eelam 
War ended when the newly elected president Kumaratunga 
opened peace talks with LTTE in 1994.
 ● Eelam War III began in 1995 after LTTE sank governmental naval 
craft. During the next few years, LTTE developed their capabilities 
and executed many suicide attacks, as well as launched numerous 
air missiles on aircrafts and helicopters of the Sri Lankan Army. 
So, during that time severe armed conflict across the North and 
East of the island lasted until the end of 2001. LTTE succeeded to 
capture some regions, which were previously controlled by the 
Sri Lankan Army. Among others, the most significant attacks were 
when LTTE bombed Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist site, the bomb 
attack on president Kumaratunga when he was wounded, and 
the devastating suicide attack on Colombo’s international airport. 
A new Norwegian-mediated ceasefire was signed by the Sri 
Lankan government and LTTE in February 2002 and negotiations 
on a political solution continued. Meanwhile, LTTE achieved new 
military power on land, air, and sea, as well as collecting enormous 
amounts of money through taxation in controlled regions and from 
3 The following overviews of the Eelam Wars I-IV compiled from Manage (2012, p.20-24), “Sri Lanka Profile, 
Timeline”, and Lunn, Taylor and Townsend (2009).
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their diaspora. One of the most important and decisive points in 
the Sri Lankan war was when LTTE East regions commander Colonel 
Karuna divided LTTE with 6000 soldiers and supporters because of 
unfair treatment of the LTTE supreme commander Prabhakaran. So, 
conflict between two fractions of LTTE reinforced with the tsunami in 
2004, finally resulted in losing a great part of the LTTE military power. 
 ● Eelam War IV began after the peace negotiation process was 
shadowed in 2006 due to the cold attitude toward peace 
negotiations of the newly elected Sri Lankan president and 
government, and several bloody attacks of LTTE on the Sri Lankan 
security forces (especially on the Navy). Also, LTTE in the North region 
arrested, tortured, and murdered numerous Tamils under suspicion 
that they were supporters of Colonel Karuna’s fraction of LTTE. These 
LTTE activities as well as their bomb attacks and Sri Lankan counter 
activities in the north, east and around Colombo’s area resulted 
with hundreds of thousands of new internally displaced persons. 
Although some observers suspected the government security forces 
for several of the attacks and assassinations rather than the LTTE, the 
international community changed its attitude and leaned towards 
supporting the government side. That resulted with wide international 
support for calls that LTTE should be declared a terrorist organization, 
first done by the U.S., UK and India, and followed in the summer of 
2006 with the most important player in the peace negotiations, the 
European Union. Reinforced with these decisions and after Karuna’s 
LTTE fraction that controlled the Eastern regions crossed over to 
support the government, the Sri Lankan security forces started wide 
operations focused on the Northern region of the island. The following 
fights were accompanied by growing reports of violations of human 
rights and the international humanitarian law from both sides in 
conflict. Concurrently, as the Sri Lankan security forces advanced in 
their final operation against LTTE they rejected international calls to 
protect civilians or for a new ceasefire, and finally on 19 May 2009 Sri 
Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa declared the end of the war 
against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
At least 7000 people are estimated to have been killed during the last 
few months when the LTTE and Tamil civilians under their control were 
squeezed into a narrowing stretch of land in north-eastern Sri Lanka - 
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making the Sri Lankan conflict one of the major conflicts in recent years 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.19). 
Sri Lanka Historical Timeline 
Since an end to a war does not guarantee a sustainable peace, the risk of 
new violence in the post-war years requests urgent and comprehensive 
conflict prevention measures. Because of the brutality of Sri Lanka’s war, 
especially in the final operations on both sides, the Sinhalese domination 
in the political system, the lack of interest in its reform and numerous 
violations of human rights, the May 2009 victory was an opportunity to 
focus on the problems that caused the conflict. Under limited international 
pressure (U.S., EU, UN, etc.) in the last few years, the Sri Lankan government 
implemented a number of post-conflict reconstruction measures, however 
most of them ended with little positive effects. 
First, the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
had been executed only unilaterally, toward Thamil Makkal Vidudal Puligal 
(TMVP) militia and 8500 released suspected LTTE, but not including the Sri 
Lanka Armed forces personnel4. DDR started immediately after the final 
4 DDR in Sri Lanka supported (but not led) by: India, Norway, the Netherlands, Japan, AusAID, USAID, World Bank, 
IOM, European Commission, UN CERF, UNDP.  
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operations, but screening of IDPs for suspected LTTE had been executed 
without any transparency or external scrutiny and with complaints of 
torture, raping of women, killings, and terrible living conditions of IDPs. 
Recently, limited results have been achieved in the education of DDR 
managers (military officers), which were followed by positive results in 
agriculture training, computer training, handwork training, preschool 
teachers training, and industrial training.
Second, limited reconciliation efforts have been overshadowed by 
Sinhalese triumphalism after the great victory. Although the government 
has portrayed itself as the Tamils’ savior and the state as a multi-ethnic 
society, reconciliation is “conditioned on the recognition of the Sri Lankan 
government as the victor and the Sinhalese armed forces as heroes”5 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2011, p.31). 
Third, security sector reform (SSR) has not been executed even after 
unprecedented levels of militarization in the years before final operations 
were expected (40% increase of the security forces). Furthermore, after 
May 2009, the Army became a hero, the demilitarization of security forces 
failed, the military budget increased, and finally the whole Sri Lankan 
security sector (coastguard, police and intelligence) fell under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Defense.
Fourth, the repatriation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has had a 
positive trend, but most of the positive activities have been executed 
under international pressure (EU, UN). Although during the years of conflict 
the number of IDPs constantly increased, the situation was additionally 
complicated after final operations when LTTE used civilians (around 
300.000) as hostages/buffer zone. Although these IDPs have recently 
been “detained” after the initial operations at 21 sites and secured as 
“concentration camps”, they were later released and around 400.000 
have already returned home (many to temporary shelters).
Finally, although justice and reconciliation, as well as political reforms have been 
weak in the Sri Lankan post-conflict reconstruction process, the improvement 
in physical reconstruction and economic development is valuable. 
5 For example, some reconciliation posters show three children (Tamil, Muslim, Sinhalese), but at the same time all of 
them show their respect to a Sri Lankan soldier.
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Physical Reconstruction and Conflict Sensitivity
The end of the 26 year war brought about 800,000 internally displaced 
people in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Most of these people are waiting 
to be resettled back, but their home areas are still without basic services, 
public facilities or infrastructure and more than 350,000 houses are 
damaged or destroyed (UN HABITAT Sri Lanka 2013b). So, the end of war 
provided opportunities for large physical reconstruction and economic 
development initiatives in the areas of North and East Sri Lanka. Although 
many national and international projects were started, a majority of 
them today are carried out under strong central government control 
without influence from local authorities. Furthermore, government security 
and economic activities in the North and East of Sri Lanka influenced 
limited inflow of Sinhalese returnees, which can further destabilize these 
traditionally Tamil areas. The state has exercised centralized control over 
a majority of the physical reconstruction projects both in the past and 
today, and its overall success is based on the government’s realization that 
if they engaged fast in rebuilding family houses and local infrastructure, 
this would provide a great positive impact for conflict prevention in the 
traditionally agricultural Tamil area (Sri Lanka Country Strategy Paper 2011 
– 2013). The government’s large role in conflict prevention through physical 
reconstruction of the North and East was not the case from the beginning. 
What happened and why did the government change its approach? 
Over the last two decades several Asian countries (China, Pakistan, 
and India) have provided assistance in post conflict reconstruction and 
development in Sri Lanka, but they do not pay attention to conflict-
sensitivities. Similarly, many other international donors after 1990 just 
transferred funds to the Sri Lankan government and left them to proceed 
without direction. That system was counterproductive and sometimes led 
to the funds being used for the further armament of security forces, and 
not for reconstruction. Nevertheless, positive changes happened when 
the European Union (EU) threatened to end the trade agreement (GSP+, 
2004)6 if the Sri Lankan government did not apply conflict-sensitivity in 
the planning and execution of its post-conflict reconstruction activities. 
Because the GSP+ helped a lot in the country’s economic development 
6 In 2004, the EU opened their market through the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP+) trade agreement 
with 17 countries devastated by the Tsunami.
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through opening the EU market for Sri Lankan products, the Sri Lankan 
government reacted positively and made moderate improvements 
in human rights, especially as related to the treatment of the internally 
displaced Tamils. Later on, many other organizations and states which 
participate in post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in 
Sri Lanka introduced conflict-sensitivity clauses. For example, the World 
Bank (WB) has developed a ‘conflict lens’ for its 2009-2013 strategy and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) designed ‘seven rules for conflict 
sensitivity’ in its strategy for 2009-2011 (OECD, 2008, pp.102-106).
Even though some large reconstruction projects started in 1999 (World 
Bank), the majority of the hundreds of international donor activities began 
after the signed peace agreement in 2002. Japan, as the biggest official 
reconstruction and development assistant in Sri Lanka, organized a donor 
conference in 2003, which was attended by the world’s most important 
donors, development banks and private funds, as well as many UN 
agencies, NGOs and states (Sugiur, 2011).
This conference influenced a new era of physical reconstruction and 
development in Sri Lanka (2003-2008) which was reinforced after 2004 
and the devastating Tsunami. Regarding the influence of the EU, a 
majority of the projects have been executed all over Sri Lanka and have 
included conflict sensitivity, but just a few of them (influenced by top 
ten donors) in the North province before 2009. Several large physical 
reconstruction projects have had great influence on the population and 
conflict prevention in the North and East of Sri Lanka, especially through 
the repatriation of internally displaced persons and poverty reduction. 
The reconstruction projects that were of the most influence are (OECD, 
2008, pp.92-101):
 ● North East Housing Reconstruction Program (NEHRP) executed with 
the World Bank and the EU (2004 – 2011). During its execution, 97% 
of the planed heavily damaged 50.091 houses were reconstructed. 
An estimate for the total number of damaged houses (all levels) for 
reconstruction is more than 300.000. 
 ● North East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP) executed with the 
World Bank (1999 – 2005). This oldest large reconstruction and 
development project in Sri Lanka rehabilitated 369 irrigation systems 
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and formed 1057 new ones, as well as worked on 1294 km of roads 
and 754 wells related to these projects. In total, more than 2.750,000 
people benefited.  
 ● Country Assistance Programs (4) in reconstruction of infrastructure, 
and the restoration of community livelihoods executed with ADB, 
the EU, OPEC, Germany, and the Netherlands (2002 – 2009): (1) North 
East Community Restoration and Development Project (NECORD) 
benefited more than 700,000 people, (2) North East Community 
Development Project (NECDP) executed through 40,000 health 
and human services, (3) Conflict Affected Areas Rehabilitation 
Project (CAARP) benefits potentially more than 2 million people, (4) 
Tsunami-Affected Areas Rebuilding Project (TAARP) benefits more 
than 3 million people. All projects were executed with a budget of 
$325 million.  
Official Development Assistance (ODA) during the conflict in Sri Lanka was 
of significant importance in reconstruction and development with 2-4% of 
national GDP, but since 2010 that changed and ODA decreased to 1,2% 
of GDP (2009-2010 official development assistance US$ 1.3 billion, -28%). 
The top ten donors through ODA in Sri Lanka are: Japan (358), World Bank 
(174), ADB (147), U.S. (63), EU (54), Australia (52), France (37), Korea (34), 
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International direct assistance programs in Sri Lanka 
(UN HABITAT Sri Lanka, 2013)
In comparison with other conflict-prevention areas (DDR, human 
rights, political reforms, SSR) the physical reconstruction and regional 
development is the one area where the Sri Lankan government has 
made the most effort. Although the first projects and application of 
conflict sensitivity were initiated (enforced) by the European Union and 
followed afterwards by other donors, in 2011 and 2012 there were positive 
examples initiated and executed by the Sri Lankan government itself. 
After the NEHRP program of housing reconstruction in the north and east 
provinces concluded in 2011, the government developed a new strategy 
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and continued the program through providing cash grants for the repair 
of damaged houses and temporary housing solutions (WB and EU financial 
support). Furthermore, several non-governmental organizations are 
allowed (without government as a mediator) to execute direct housing 
reconstruction programs with all related infrastructure. Through these 
programs the Sri Lankan government has supported conflict-prevention in 
several points: returnees to the Tamil area were provided the opportunity 
to rebuild their houses faster, the local economy was revitalized through 
the employment of private construction companies, the unemployment 
rate was reduced (construction workers are 100% local Tamils), and 
agriculture as a primary business in the North can be revitalized7.
A University of York (UK) public opinion research project carried out in Sri 
Lanka in 2011 found that the Tamil population is very satisfied with the 
dynamic and quantity of physical reconstruction. The only item mentioned 
as a problem is the necessity to revitalize a local public transportation 
system and the sea ports. Moreover, during the almost three years since 
the end of the conflict, the government self-financed and executed 
many small local infrastructure rebuilding projects. During these projects 
they used interesting and useful conflict-prevention techniques through 
employing local Tamil construction companies and engaging the Sri 
Lankan military forces. The Sri Lankan Army situated in the North of the 
island (since May 2009) have carried out different construction projects, 
from large ones oriented at communities (rebuilding bridges, roads, 
irrigation systems, wells, de-mining) to small ones oriented toward families 
(Barakat and Class of 2011, 2011).
 
Construction works conducted by Army troops (Sri Lanka Army, 2012)
7 Information collected by the author in interviews with Sri Lankan military officers in Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, US, March, 2012.
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These physical reconstruction projects with strong roots in military 
information operations played a great role in conflict prevention and 
since May 2009 there has been no reported violence against the Sri 
Lankan Armed forces. Furthermore, in that period, only a few riots have 
occurred in the north of Sri Lanka, regarding the prohibition of celebrating 
Tamil national holidays, but all were suppressed by police without heavy 
casualties8.
Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan government still keeps under direct control 
all international reconstruction efforts and allows for occasional and 
limited oversight and control. It is interesting that the majority of the top 
ten donors execute their projects almost 100% through the Sri Lankan 
government, and only Asian donors including China, Pakistan, and India 
(not in the top 10) execute 60% of their projects through direct payments 
to the contractors or local authorities (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011).  
Finally, the Sri Lankan government has executed many physical 
reconstruction projects with conflict sensitivity (some enforced). The 
majority of these projects is a great success, and is accepted well by 
the Tamils; allowing reconstruction to become the main pillar for conflict 
prevention. 
Conflict Prevention Through Economic Development
Although many international investors labeled opportunities in Sri Lanka as 
‘wonderful opportunities’, claiming that Sri Lanka ’may become the Hong 
Kong of India’, and that Sri Lanka provided a ‘huge opportunity to do a 
lot’, some investors were also very cautious and commented that “the 
future depends upon the government’s initiative to satisfactorily address 
the root causes of the conflict” (First Private Equity Fund from Sri Lanka, 
2012). 
8 Information collected by author in interviews with Sri Lankan military officers in Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, US, March, 2012.
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Nevertheless, despite the latest long conflict, the Tsunami of 2004, and 
the World economic crisis, over the last two decades Sri Lanka’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth average rates have been 5.5%, which 
is an excellent result (Sri Lanka has been in the world top 10 according 
to GDP growth rates over the last ten years). During 2009 and the final 
operations of Sri Lankan armed forces the growth rate dropped to 
3.5%, but then only a year after it rapidly increased to 8.0%. Today, the 
GDP growth rate looks positive at 8-10%, but if it is examined in detail, 
economic development so far is unequal. Until 2010 most of the growth 
rate was related to the Western part of Sri Lanka, especially areas around 
the capital city of Colombo, which contributes 50% to the national GDP. 
Although the end of the conflict resulted in decreasing activities of 
international donors, many new international companies and funds find 
Sri Lanka an excellent place for investments, which the government tries 
to maximize (Sri Lanka Country Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013). In order to 
change the inequality in the country’s economic development and further 
stimulate conflict prevention, the Sri Lankan government in cooperation 
with the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) 
developed a Strategy for 2011-2013 with four pillars: (1) large housing and 
public facilities reconstruction in Tamil areas (being a joint effort with the 
private sector), (2) government led reconstruction of main infrastructure 
(in order to support businesses), (3) direct business investments (support 
funds), and (4) real-estate investments (in order to help the real-estate 
market emerge) ( Sri Lanka Country Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013).
Regarding poverty as one of the indicators of the country’s economic 
development, Sri Lanka has reached lower-middle income status and has 
shown a very positive trend. The overall poverty ratio, in spite of conflict, 
was significantly improved during the last decade and decreased from 
23% in 2002, to 15% in 2006, and 15% in 2009, and finally reaching the 
remarkable level (for Asia) of 7.6% in 2010. Even given these improvements 
countrywide, the presence of poverty is higher in rural areas, as well as 
in the Tamil populated areas, which are influenced by several factors 
including: the former state favored investment in the Western area, 
the long lasting conflict in the Northern and Eastern areas (destroyed 
local businesses and infrastructure), and the Tsunami in December 2004 
which worsened the situation and further destroyed the East and South 
of the country. Nevertheless, even during the conflict some modest 
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improvements in poverty reduction have been done in the Tamil areas. 
The largest activity was the Project for Rehabilitation through Education 
and Training (PRET), organized by the Canadian Investment Development 
Agency (CIDA) during 2003-2008, which covered 14 districts and was 
executed in relationship with 46 international and national partner 
organizations (OECD, 2008; World Bank ‘Sri Lanka’, 2012).  
There have been many recent changes in the government’s approach 
to regionally oriented poverty eradication and economic development. 
The most significant influence on overall development and government 
conflict prevention behavior nowadays is a program announced during 
the elections in 2010 by president Rajapaksa called the “Mahinda 
Chintana - Vision for the Future” (2010-2020). The main ideas include an 
open call for building of the Sri Lankan economy, involving the public 
and private investors, encouraging business competition, building new 
infrastructure necessary for business (airports, seaports, roads), and 
large scale investments in Tamil areas. The Vision explains four economic 
development programs, (1) Dry zone livelihood support and partnership 
program, (2) Smallholder plantations entrepreneurship development 
program, (3) Post Tsunami coastal rehabilitation and resource 
management program, and (4) National agribusiness development 
program. The Sri Lankan government recently signed several agreements 
in support of the Vision for a total amount of $137 million, which included 
the involvement of many private companies, as well as international 
organizations (IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development, 
USAID – US Agency for International Development, CIDA – Canadian 
International Development Agency, JBIC - Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation, WFP – World Food Program, and UNDP – UN Development 
Program) (Mahinda Chintana - Vision for the Future, 2010).
With a new strategy and devoted investments in economic development 
to maximize conflict prevention, the Sri Lankan government is finally 
making a strong attempt to counter underdevelopment, one of the roots 
of the conflict, and in spite of a failure in other post conflict reconstruction 
areas, they deserve recognition that this area is a success.
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Conclusion
Generally, post conflict reconstruction in Sri Lanka is characterized by 
limited or nonexistent progress in judicial, political and security sector 
reforms, reconciliation, and the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, 
post-conflict physical reconstruction activities and most of the activities 
related to economic development have been executed well and 
influenced very positively Tamil - Sinhalese relations. Although the Sri 
Lankan government has failed or has achieved limited positive effects 
with various conflict prevention measures in the preceding decades, the 
fast de-mining, new housing programs, the resettlement of hundreds of 
thousands of IDPs, and a number of massive infrastructure projects with 
special emphasis on the North and East of the island (Tamil areas) had 
significant positive effects. At the beginning, this success was enforced 
by international players such as the EU, the UN or the US. On the other 
hand, today there are many examples of the Sri Lankan government’s 
sensitiveness in reconstruction without external pressure.
Many of these physical reconstruction projects, along with projects for the 
reduction of poverty or decreasing unemployment rates, have become 
very important Sri Lankan conflict prevention measures. The future will 
show if they can create a sustainable peace. Such peace is not far 
away for Sri Lanka, especially if the key international players (EU, UN, US, 
and Japan) would support the government of Sri Lanka, after economic 
development, to focus on reforms in the judicial, political and security 
sectors as well as on the protection of human rights, . 
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